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Abstract
This paper is a state of the art review of the use of formal methods in the design of
cryptographic protocols.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are used to provide secure services in distributed systems. However,
if the protocol is not designed carefully enough, it may contain aws, which can be the ideal
starting point for various attacks. Such aws can be subtle and hard to nd. A number
of examples exist in the academic literature of aws that were not found for some time
in protocols that had received intensive analysis. These examples include the Needham-
Schroeder authenticated key distribution protocol [NS78], which was found by Denning and
Sacco to allow an intruder to pass an old, compromised session key as a new one to a legitimate
party [DS81]; a protocol in the CCITT X.509 draft standard [CCITT], for which Burrows,
Abadi, and Needham showed that an intruder can cause an old session key to be accepted as
a new one, whether or not it had been compromised [BAN90a]; and many others.
These examples show that the informal design of cryptographic protocols is error prone.
Formal methods seem to be better suited for solving the problem. Formal methods have
long been used in the design and analysis of communication protocols in general. From the
early 90's, they are widespreadly used in the eld of cryptographic protocols too. Formal
techniques can be used in various phases of the design of a cryptographic protocol. These
phases include the specication, the construction, and the verication. Up to now, most
of the work was concentrated on the formal verication of cryptographic protocols. There

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are also some notable work on the formal specication of protocols. However, using formal
methods to construct protocols in a systematic way is an undiscovered area yet. In the sequel,
we give an overview of the most signicant results in the formal specication, construction,
and verication of cryptographic protocols. More thorough surveys can be found in [RH93],
[Mea95], and [GNG97].
2 Specication
The design of a cryptographic protocol begins with the specication of the requirements that
the designer wants the protocol to satisfy. This means that the designer should have a clear
idea of what he/she wants the protocol to achieve, thus, what the correctness of the protocol
means. However, expressing the correctness criteria of a protocol is not trivial. Early work on
this eld concentrated on secrecy as the main correctness criterion. Later, it was realised to
be inadequate, since many cryptographic protocols provide services, such as authentication,
that are only indirectly related to secrecy. This problem has been approached from several
dierent angles, some with the aim of developing a set of criteria that can be applied to
protocols in general, and others with the aim of developing ways to express criteria for a
number of dierent types of protocols.
In [DvW92], Die et. al. present informal requirements for the correctness of an authen-
tication protocol. Briey, they say that session keys should remain secret and that protocol
runs should match. The latter means that if A and B run a protocol then A's record of
messages received from B should match B's record of messages sent to A, and vica versa.
This notion has been formalised by Bellare and Rogaway in [BR94], using a model based on
communicating probabilistic Turing machines. The notion of matching runs has also been
formalised by Syverson in his extension of the Abadi-Tuttle logic to include temporal for-
malisms [Syv93]. In [WL93], Woo and Lam take a similar approach to dening security of
authentication protocols. They dene a semantic model for authentication protocols that is
based on two basic security properties, correspondence and secrecy. The former requires that
certain events can take place only if others have taken place previously. This is very similar to
the notion of matching runs, but it is broader, since the events do not have to be the sending
and the receiving of the same message.
Another approach to specifying requirements for protocols is presented in the requirements
language developed for the NRL Protocol Analyser [SM93]. The requirements specied in this
language have a form similar to the notion of correspondence of Woo and Lam, in that the
requirements are given on sequences of events. The dierence is that, instead of giving general
requirements for correspondence that applies to all protocols, the user of the language can
specify requirements for protocols of a particular class. Thus, requirements can vary according
to the intended function of the protocol. Furthermore, the action, by which the intruder learns
a word is modelled as an event, thus, secrecy does not need to be dened as a separate part of
the model. In [SM93], Syverson and Meadows give a set of requirements for various kinds of
message authentication protocols, while in [SM95], they give requirements for key distribution
protocols with repeated authentication.
Specifying requirements for cryptographic protocols in a formal way can be useful in
understanding the problems that the designer of the protocol has to solve, and in bridging
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the abstraction gap between informal correctness criteria and the formal protocol description.
Therefore, it helps the design of cryptographic protocols.
3 Construction
Most of the existing work in the application of formal methods to cryptographic protocols
has been concentrated on the formal verication of existing protocols. However, it would be
cheaper and more eective to use these methods in the design of the protocol in the rst
place, and so save the expense of redesign. Although, the use of formal methods in the design
is a natural application of the technology, not much research has been done in this particular
area.
One approach to incorporate formal methods into the design is to develop specic method-
ologies for design of protocols so that they will be more amenable to analysis by formal
methods. This approach is taken by Heintze and Tygar in [HT94]. They develop a modu-
lar approach to design cryptographic protocols. They design a family of tools for reasoning
about protocol security and prove a composition theorem that allows them to state sucient
conditions on two secure protocols, such that they may be combined to form a new secure
protocol. They give counter-examples to show that when the conditions are not met, the new
protocol may not be secure.
In [GS95], Gong and Syverson present a new methodology to facilitate the design and
analysis of secure cryptographic protocols. They propose to restrict protocol designs to
well-dened practices, instead of ever increasing the complexity of protocol security anal-
ysis mechanisms to deal with every newly discovered attack and the endless variations in
protocol construction. In particular, they introduce a novel notion of a fail-stop protocol,
which automatically halts in response to any active attack, thus reducing protocol security
analysis to that of passive attacks only. Excluding the possibility of an active attack makes
the validation of the paradoxical secrecy assumption in BAN-like logics easier, and thus, puts
modal logic based analysis methods on a stronger footing. Gong and Syverson suggest types
of protocols that are fail-stop, however, their suggestion might not be practical for some ap-
plications. In [KS96], Keromytis and Smith present a generic method for creating ecient
fail-stop cryptographic protocols.
An alternative approach to use formal methods in the design of cryptographic protocols is
a layered one [Mea95], in which a relatively abstract model is used at the top layer, and each
succeeding layer is proved to be an implementation (renement) of the layer above it, until
nally either a detailed specication or the actual protocol code is produced. This approach
is taken by the recent author et. al. in [BSW98]. They propose a BAN-like logic extended
with the notion of channels with various access restrictions that can be used as the abstract
model at the top layer. In particular, based on the logic they construct synthetic rules that
they use to derive high level protocol descriptions from the goals of the protocol. A similar
method on a stronger footing is described in [AFS97] by Alves-Foss and Soule, although they
do not actually use their results for deriving protocols.
In [BM94], Boyd and Mao propose a technique to design key exchange protocols that are
guaranteed to be correct in the sense that a specied security criterion will not be violated if
the protocol participants act correctly. This technique is developed from basic cryptographic
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properties that are held by a variety of cryptographic algorithms. Protocols can be developed
abstractly and any particular type of algorithm that possesses the required property can then
be used in a concrete implementation.
Finally, we mention [AN94], in which Abadi and Needham present principles for designing
cryptographic protocols. Their principles are informal guidelines, but they can complement
formal methods. The principles presented are neither necessary nor sucient for correctness of
protocols, however, they are helpful in that adherence to them would have prevented a number
of published errors. In [Syv96], Syverson criticises this approach. He presents limitations and
exceptions on some of the basic design principles, and gives examples for secure protocols
that fail to meet the principles.
4 Verication
In [Mea95], Meadows classies approaches to the formal analysis of cryptographic protocols
into four types:
 Modelling and verifying the protocol using specication languages and verication tools
not specically developed for the analysis of cryptographic protocols.
 Developing expert systems that a protocol designer can use to investigate dierent
scenarios.
 Modelling and verifying the protocol using modal logics developed for the analysis of
knowledge and belief.
 Developing a formal model based on the algebraic term-rewriting properties of crypto-
graphic systems.
In the sequel, we follow this classication. Since we are interested in the logic based design
of security services, we put the emphasis on the modal logic based approach.
4.1 Using general purpose verication tools
The main idea of this approach is to treat a cryptographic protocol as any other (distributed)
program and attempt to prove its correctness. The rst step is to specify the protocol and
its correctness requirements so that the techniques apply. For this purpose, Varadharajan
uses LOTOS [Var90], Kemmerer species the system in Ina Jo [Kem89], while others use
even more general description techniques such as state machines [Var89] or Petri nets [NT92].
Once the protocol and its requirements are specied, it can be investigated by using the tools
that are available in the formalism used.
In [Var90], Varadharajan proposes the use of LOTOS to analyse authentication protocols.
He gives example specications of protocols in LOTOS, but he cannot demonstrate any result
in their analysis. The paper concludes by stating that LOTOS tools are not yet adequate for
this kind of analysis.
4
In [Kem89] and [KMM94], Kemmerer uses an extension of rst-order predicate calculus, a
formal specication language called Ina Jo. Ina Jo was designed as a general purpose tool to
support software development and correctness proofs. Kemmerer describes an example secu-
rity system, and then gives an Ina Jo specication of it. He also species critical requirements
that the system is to satisfy in all states. Once the specication is complete, Ina Jo generates
theorems that can be used to verify if the critical requirements are satised. Kemmerer un-
covers a weakness in his sample system, but the value of this method is limited, because the
specication of the critical requirements needs that the designer knows the potential attacks
in advance.
In [Var89], Varadharajan describes how to specify a protocol using state diagrams. Each
party of the protocol is described by a state diagram, and then the protocol is represented
as the cross product of the state diagrams for each individual parties. Once the protocol
is described in this way, the designer can investigate various executions of the protocol by
applying a technique known as the reachability analysis. Reachability analysis techniques are
eective in determining whether or not a protocol is correct with respect to its specication,
but they do not guarantee resistance against an active intruder. This would require to model
the intruder, which, in general, leads to the quick growth of the number of the states (state
explosion problem).
In [NT92], Nieh and Tavares uses a Petri net based methodology for the formal modelling
and analysis of cryptographic protocols. In particular, they use coloured Petri nets to model
protocols. Their model also includes a general intruder model that can be used to formulate
intruder attacks and generate test cases. The analysis of the security properties of crypto-
graphic protocols is based on an exhaustive penetration test that searches for scenarios that
violate certain specied criteria. These criteria are dened in terms of requirements on Petri
net states of the protocol. Although, coloured Petri nets enable to produce compact and
manageable protocol descriptions, tools that support the eective execution of an exhaustive
search are still missing. The designer can translate these high level Petri nets into ordinary
Petri nets, and can use tools available for those, but then he/she has to cope with the state
explosion problem again.
A more recent approach models the protocol participants as Communicating Sequential
Processes (CSP) and uses the Failure Divergence's Renement (FDR) checker, which is a
general purpose tool that can be used to determine whether an implementation renes a
specication. First FDR has been used to analyse many sorts of systems, including distributed
databases and communication protocols, but recently it has been used to analyse security
protocols as well [Ros95] [Low96]. Another recent approach is to use the Higher Order Logic
(HOL) for stating and proving properties of cryptographic protocols [Sne95]. Tools that are
based on HOL and used for analysing cryptographic protocols are include Convince [LHB96]
and Isabelle [BP97].
Although, there are some notable attempts to use general purpose verication tools for
analysing cryptographic protocols, they are, in general, not suitable for this purpose. The
main weakness of this approach is that in applying methods that were not intended specically
for security analysis, subtle pitfalls that are peculiar to the security domain are not considered.
Furthermore, including the intruder with full generality into the model leads to the state
explosion problem and makes the analysis infeasible.
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4.2 Developing expert systems
The idea of this approach is to develop expert systems that the protocol designer can use to
generate and investigate various scenarios. Most of these systems are based on an underlying,
state machine based model of the protocol. But, as opposed to the state machine based
analysis of cryptographic protocols described in the previous subsection, these systems begin
with an undesirable state and attempt to discover if this state is reachable from an initial
state.
One of the earliest system of this approach is the Interrogator by Millen et. al. [MCF87].
In the Interrogator, protocol participants are modelled as communicating state machines
whose messages to each other are intercepted by the intruder who can either destroy messages,
modify them, or let them pass through unmodied. Given a nal state, in which the intruder
knows some word which should be secret, the Interrogator tries all possible ways to construct
a path by which that state can be reached. If it nds such a path, then a security aw is
identied. The Interrogator has not yet found a previously unknown attack on a cryptographic
protocol, but it has been able to reproduce a number of known attacks [KMM94].
The NRL Protocol Analyzer by Meadows [KMM94] is similar to the Interrogator: the
designer species an insecure state and the Analyzer attempts to construct a path to that
state from an initial state. Unlike the Interrogator, an unlimited number of protocol rounds
are allowed in a single path. This allows the Analyzer to discover attacks that rely on the
intruder's ability to weave several dierent runs of a protocol together. Also unlike the
Interrogator, the emphasis is, not only on nding paths to insecure states, but on proving
that these states are unreachable. This is made possible by having the user prove that certain
paths leading backwards from an insecure state go into innite loops, thus never reach an
initial state. Once these paths have been eliminated, the resulting search space is often small
enough to search exhaustively. The proofs that paths lead into innite loops are largely
guided by the user, thus, the search is less automated than in the Interrogator. The NRL
Protocol Analyzer has been successful in nding several previously unknown security aws in
cryptographic protocols [Mea91] [Mea92].
In [LR92], Longley and Rigby use a rule based system that transforms goals into subgoals
and can constantly continue this process. They use this rule based scheme to build a tree, in
which each node represents a data item, and the children of a node represent those data items
that are required for the knowledge of the data represented by the father node. In this way,
they can construct a tree, in which the root node represents the data required by the intruder
for an attack (e.g., a cryptographic key), and the leaves represent those data items that are
required to know the root item. The Longley and Rigby tool allows the user to interact with
the system. The user can determine whether a data can or cannot be found by the intruder.
If the data is judged to be accessible, this information can be inserted into the system, and
the generation of the tree can proceed. Longley and Rigby managed to nd a subtle and
previously unknown aw in a hierarchical key management scheme.
Expert systems developed specically for the analysis of cryptographic protocols are more
successful than general purpose tools. However, they are often inecient because they perform
exhaustive search. Sometimes they do not even halt and the results are inconclusive. To cope
with these problems, they require human intervention. Their advantage is that if they discover
a aw, then the attack scenario that exploits the aw is directly available, which is not the
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case with the more popular modal logic based approach described in the next subsection.
4.3 Modal logic based approach
The main idea of this approach is to use modal logics, similar to those that has been developed
for the analysis of the evolution of knowledge and belief during the execution of distributed
algorithms [HM90], for modelling and analysing cryptographic protocols. After all, crypto-
graphic protocols can be viewed as distributed algorithms. Such logics consists of a language,
which is used to describe various statements about the protocol such as what the participants
know or believe, and some inference rules, which are used to derive new statements from pre-
viously derived statements. The goal of the analysis is to derive a statement that represents
the correctness condition of the protocol. The designer's inability to do so means that the
protocol may not be correct. The analysis often reveals the possible weakness in the protocol,
and an attack can be constructed easily afterwards.
The best known and most inuential logic of this type is called BAN logic [BAN90b]. It
can be used to describe the beliefs of trustworthy parties involved in authentication protocols
and the evolution of these beliefs as a consequence of communication. It has been successfully
applied to discover aws in a variety of authentication protocols and has also been helpful
in the understanding of the basic concepts of authentication. BAN logic is simple, which
might be one of the reasons for its popularity. The need for many universal assumptions in
the underlying model, however, is a minor disadvantage. In BAN logic, it is assumed that
principals of the system are trustworthy and do not release secrets (this has not always been
understood with its full meaning [Nes90]); the applied encryption schemes are strong (i.e.,
encrypted messages can be decrypted only with the appropriate key); each encrypted message
contains sucient redundancy to allow a principal who decrypts it to verify that it has used
the right key; and principals can recognise and ignore their own messages.
BAN logic does not attempt to model a protocol in a richness as other logics do. It does
not attempt to model the distinction between seeing a message and understanding it; it does
not attempt to model the revision of beliefs; it does not attempt to model trust or the lack
of it; and nally, it does not attempt to model knowledge. The avoidance of these issues is
intentional in BAN logic; this makes it simple and straightforward. However, this also means
that these issues have to be addressed in the informal mapping from protocol specication to
BAN specication. This mapping is called idealisation. Burrows et. al. consider the idealised
protocols as clearer and more complete specications than the traditional descriptions found
in the literature, which they view as implementation dependent encodings of the protocol. Al-
though, this is true, no clear idealisation method is presented, which led to misunderstandings
and the misuse of the logic [Nes90] [BM93].
To overcome these problems, Abadi and Tuttle reformulate the original BAN logic and
provide a new semantics for it in [AT91]. Abadi and Tuttle identies many sources of the
confusion created by BAN logic. They remove some unnecessary mixing of semantic and
implementation details in the original denitions and inference rules. They dene all concepts,
such as seeing, saying, believing, etc., independently rather than jointly with other concepts.
They reformulate the set of inference rules as an axiomatisation with modus ponens and
necessitation as the only rules. These changes make the logic much simpler and allow them
to dispense with an implicit assumption of honesty (it is not needed anymore that principals
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believe the messages they send), which is not well-dened in general. One of the greatest
contribution of the paper is a formal semantics, which denes belief as a form of resource-
bounded, defeasible knowledge. Abadi and Tuttle claim that the reformulated logic is sound
according to the new semantics dened. However, Syverson and van Oorschot point out in
[SvO94] that one of the axioms is not sound. Abadi and Tuttle are still working on a revision
of their paper
1
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BAN logic has been extended in many directions. In [GNY90], Gong et. al. propose a logic
referenced later as GNY logic. In GNY logic, it is not required to assume that principals are
trustworthy and redundancy is always explicitly present in encrypted messages. GNY logic
distinguishes between what a principal can possess and what it can believe in. It enables
to express dierent trust levels and implicit conditions behind protocol steps. This makes
GNY logic a more realistic model of cryptographic protocols than BAN logic. However, GNY
logic has more than 40 inference rules, which has led many to reject this approach as being
impractical.
Other extensions of BAN logic include [MB93], in which Mao and Boyd propose a logic
with several improvements on the original BAN logic; [GS91], in which Gaarder and Snekkenes
extend BAN logic with constructs to reason about time; [van93], in which van Oorschot ex-
tends BAN and GNY to deal with key agreement protocols such as Die-Hellman; and
[CSNP92], in which Cambell et. al. extend BAN logic using probabilistic reasoning to cal-
culate a measure of trust rather than complete trust. The list of extensions above is not
complete; there are many other works in this eld.
In [SvO94], Syverson and van Oorschot propose a logic, later referenced as SvO, that
encompasses a unication of four of its predecessors in the BAN family, namely GNY logic
[GNY90], the Abadi-Tuttle logic [AT91], the logic proposed by van Oorschot in [van93],
and BAN itself [BAN90b]. The proposed logic captures all of the desirable features of its
predecessors, nonetheless, it accomplishes this with no more axioms or rules than the simplest
of its predecessors. Syverson and van Oorschot also present a model-theoretic semantics with
respect to which the logic is sound.
The importance of having an alternative, independently motivated semantics is empha-
sised by Syverson in [Syv90], [Syv91b], [Syv91a], and [Syv92]. A formal semantics provides
a precise structure with respect to which soundness and completeness of the logic may be
proven, and thus, which allows us to evaluate the logic. If a logic does not have an indepen-
dently motivated semantics, then whatever assurances protocol analysis via such logic brings
may prove illusory. Syverson also illustrates how the semantics itself can be used as a reason-
ing tool to discover results that would be very dicult or impossible to prove by reasoning
syntactically.
There are a number of other logics that do not belong to the BAN family. These in-
clude Bieber's CKT5 [Bie90], Syverson's KPL [Syv90], Moser's logic [Mos89], Rangan's logic
[Ran88], and the system of Yahalom et. al. [YKB93]. Bieber's CKT5 and Syverson's KPL
can be used to reason about the evolution of knowledge about words used in a cryptographic
protocol. They also make a distinction between seeing a message and understanding its sig-
nicance. Moser's logic is particular, because it is the only non-monotonic logic considered
here. It can be used to reason about beliefs of protocol participants, and about how these
1
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beliefs change if, for instance, a key used in a secure communication becomes compromised.
Rangan's logic can be used to reason about the eect of trust in the composition of secure
communications channels, and provides a formal basis for the evolution of belief from trust.
The system of Yahalom et. al. is used to derive information about the nature of the trust
that parties in a protocol must have in each other in order a protocol to operate correctly.
Using modal logics of knowledge and belief is the most popular approach to apply formal
methods in the analysis of cryptographic protocols. The reason is, probably, that these logics
are easy to use and intuitive. However, one must be careful, because there are often subtle
assumptions in the underlying model, getting away from which may lead to the misuse of the
logic and errors in the analysis. Thus, the designer has to know the scope of the logic applied
and has to be aware of its limitations.
4.4 Algebraic approach
Another approach to apply formal methods to cryptographic protocol analysis is to model
the protocol as an algebraic system. Research in this area has not been as active as research
in developing logics of belief and knowledge. However, algebraic models was successful to
represent very subtle kinds of knowledge in cryptographic protocols. Furthermore, the fact
that the objects modelled correspond strongly to entities and messages used in the tools
based on state machines suggests that algebraic models could be used to provide the state
machine tools with a stronger capability of modelling the knowledge that the intruder can gain
[Mea95]. However, the question of how these algebras can be incorporated in state machine
based analysis tools is still open.
The rst work that considers a cryptographic protocol to be an algebraic system is [DY83]
by Dolev and Yao. In their model, Dolev and Yao assume that the network is under the
control of the intruder who can read all trac, alter and destroy messages, and perform any
operation, such as encryption, that is available to legitimate users of the system. However, it
is assumed that initially the intruder does not know any information that is to be kept secret,
such as encryption keys belonging to legitimate users of the system. Since the intruder can
prevent any message from reaching its destination, and since he/she can also create messages
of his/her own, Dolev and Yao treat any message sent by a legitimate user as a message sent
to the intruder and any message received by a legitimate user as a message received from
the intruder. Thus, the system becomes a machine used by the intruder to generate words.
These words obey certain rewrite rules, such as the fact that encryption and decryption with
the same key cancel each other out. Thus, nally, the intruder manipulates a term rewriting
system. If the goal of the intruder is to nd out a word that is meant to be secret, then the
problem of proving a protocol secure is equivalent to the problem of proving that a certain
word cannot be generated in a term rewriting system. Dolev and Yao uses this idea to
investigate the security of certain classes of public key protocols. They dene the notion of
cascade protocols and name-stamp protocols. They give sucient and necessary conditions for
cascade protocols to be secure, and provide a polynomial time algorithm to decide if a given
name-stamp protocol is secure.
The Dolev-Yao model is too restricted to be useful for the analysis of most protocols. It can
only be used to detect failures of secrecy, and it does not allow participants to remember state
information from one state to the next. Thus, most later works extend it to be capable for
9
analysing other classes of protocols. These works include [Mer83], in which Merritt generalises
the technique of Dolev and Yao to model diverse cryptographic systems and to formally state
and prove security properties other than secrecy. In [Tou92], Toussaint describes a technique
for deriving the complete knowledge of participants in cryptographic protocols that is based
on the algebraic model of Merritt.
A more recent work is [AG98], in which Abadi and Gordon use the pi calculus to describe
protocols at an abstract level. They use the pi calculus primitives for channels, in particular
the scoping rules, to model certain properties of cryptographic protocols. Then, they extend
the pi calculus to what they call spi calculus to analyse protocols at a less abstract level. The
spi calculus permits an explicit representation of the use of cryptography in protocols. In
the spi calculus, security properties of the protocol are expressed as equivalences between spi
calculus processes (e.g., a protocol keeps secret a piece of data X if the protocol with X is
equivalent to the protocol with X
0
for every X
0
). The intruder is not explicitly modelled, and
this is a main advantage of the approach. Modelling the intruder can be tedious and can lead
to errors (e.g., it is very dicult to model that the intruder can invent random numbers but
is not lucky enough to guess the random secrets on which the protocol depends). Instead,
the intruder is represented as an arbitrary spi calculus process.
5 Conclusion
We gave an overview of the recent approaches to use formal methods in the design of cryp-
tographic protocols. Formal methods can be used in various phases of the design, such as
specication, construction, and verication. Up to now, most of the work concentrated on
the formal verication of protocols, and in particular, on the application of modal logics
of knowledge and belief for modelling and analysing protocols. Using formal methods in the
specication of cryptographic protocols is an emerging area of research, while formal methods
to construct protocols in a systematic way are just appearing.
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